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Abstract 
The question to what extent corruption influences suicide remains still unanswered. This paper 
examines the effect of corruption on suicide using a panel data approach for 24 OECD countries 
over the period 1995-2004. Our results show that suicide rates are lower in countries with lower 
levels of corruption. We also find evidence that this effect is approximately three times larger for 
males than for females. It follows from these findings that corruption has a detrimental effect on 
societal well-being and its effect differs based on the social position of genders. 
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Introduction 
 
Ideally, governments can be expected to improve quality of life and increase well-being by 
preventing market failure. Indeed, if the ultimate goal of any government is the continuous 
improvement of quality of life for its citizens, through a sustainable economic growth path for the 
macroeconomy, then government policies and practices should be targeting individual well-being. 
In the real world, this does not hold true. Since the seminal work of Mauro (1995) showing that 
corruption hampers economic growth, a growing number of studies have investigated the impact of 
corruption on various facets of society
4
. Recently, researchers have paid attention to a more 
fundamental issue by examining the association between governance and well-being (Helliwell and 
Huang 2008; Fischer and Rodríguez 2008; Ott 2010, among others).  
Self-reported measures of subjective well-being are often criticized for lack of reliability and 
validity (for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). Koivumaa et al. (2001) provide evidence 
that there is a high correlation between suicide and subjective well-being at individual and 
aggregate levels. Unlike self-reported measures, suicide data
5
 are more frequently used in 
cross-country comparisons. Self-reported data comparisons are difficult because of problems with 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. Indeed, Daly and Wilson (2009), using data for the United 
States, assert that well-being and suicide rates share common determinants. Thus, suicide rate is 
thought to be an appropriate proxy for societal well-being. Using suicide rates as an indicator of 
societal well-being has a great advantage in that this measure represents a more reliable and 
objective indicator of well-being compared to self-reported well-being measures (Helliwell 2007).  
                                                   
4 For instance, it has been found that corruption has a detrimental effect on the damage 
from natural disasters (Kahn 2005; Escaleras et al. 2007). Corruption causes traffic 
accidents (Anbarci et al. 2006). Corruption is negatively related to access to improved 
drinking water and adequate sanitation (Anbarci et al. 2009). 
5 The term suicide refers to completed suicides throughout this paper, unless noted 
otherwise. 
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Apart from researches of corruption and subjective well-being, economists also claim that 
suicidal behavior cannot be perfectly explained by social factors or psychiatric illness but may 
involve rational economic decision making (e.g., Hamermersh 1974; Hamermersh and Soss 1974). 
The empirical literature has also relied on the theory of social integration by Durkheim (1966). The 
economic and sociological approaches of suicide motivate many of the control variables employed 
in a variety of econometric studies of macro level determinants of suicide (see. However, few 
researchers have attempted to examine the association between suicide and the quality of 
governance. In the present study, we investigate the effect of corruption on suicide rates. In addition, 
we examine the existence of a gender effect on suicide rates, as the determinants could differ across 
genders.(e.g. Andrés 2005; Chuang and Huang 2007; Minoiu and Andrés 2008; 
Yamamura, 2010). Understanding the gender differences may also be important in 
informing appropriate policy formulations6. For this purpose, we employ a fixed effects 
model to conduct estimation for 24 OECD countries covering 1995-2004. In what follows, we 
present the theoretical background and hypothesis. Next, data and empirical model and estimation 
results are exhibited. The paper concludes with a summary of our findings. 
 
Theoretical background and hypothesis 
Corruption arguably impacts the efficiency of government policies and practices by 
distorting incentives, implementation practices and thus outcomes. These distortions 
have been proved considerably inhibiting for individual well-being through several 
economic and social channels.   
The literature examining the impact of corruption on economic growth has been 
                                                   
6 In Japan, divorce causes the propensity to commit suicide among males to become about 
two times higher than that among females due to the compensation costs that males are 
more likely to pay to females (Yamamura, 2010). 
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vast. Among others Mauro (1995, 1996), provides evidence that corruption is 
negatively associated with growth rates of per capita income, thus hindering standards 
of living. In addition, Sacks, Stevenson, and Wolfers (2010) argue that economic 
growth increases individual self reported well-being (proxied by life satisfaction). 
Deteriorating living conditions, in terms of income and consumption levels, are 
expected to hinder utility and individual happiness levels. As happiness levels drop, 
depression symptoms increase and thus suicides are expected more frequently. Earlier 
research on the effects of growth on happiness (Easterlin 1995) reports that economic 
growth has no impact on self-reported happiness levels in the long run. Easterlin 
(1995) finds that what matters for life satisfaction levels is the relative and not the 
absolute level of income.  
In addition, according to Mo (2001) corruption favors a particular class of people 
creating inequalities in opportunities (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; You and Khagram, 
2005; You 2005). This fact, directly related with productivity retardation and income 
inequality, creates instabilities and hampers social cohesion. As a result, due to the 
“unfavorable” treatment certain social classes receive, they become marginalized and 
fail to reach their full potential. In addition, such income inequalities interfere with 
the relative position of individuals in a society, thus affecting happiness. Easterlin 
(1974, 1995, 2003), Kasser and Ryan (1993), and Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) 
provide evidence that it is relative and not absolute income that matters most. Hence, 
income inequalities make part of the society relatively worse off, decreasing their 
happiness and well-being levels. For instance, Alesina et al. (2004) find that aggregate 
income inequality negatively affects subjective well-being in a panel of 13 developed 
countries between 1975 and 1996. This finding is inconsistent with Bjørnskov et al. 
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(2008), who conclude that income inequality is not robustly associated with 
self-reported well-being by employing an extreme bound analysis approach.  
 
Helliwell and Putnam (2004) investigate the social correlates of subjective 
well-being. Their study reveals a positive association between a) governance quality 
and b) average trust, measured both at the national and the community level, on life 
satisfaction and self-reported happiness levels. The association between life 
satisfaction and aggregate governmental quality7 measures is further investigated in 
detail by Helliwell (2003) and Helliwell and Huang (2008). Helliwell and Huang (2008) 
find a strong positive effect of government delivery mechanisms, i.e. governmental 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, on life 
satisfaction and subjective well-being. This effect appears to be stronger in countries 
with higher per capita income levels. For instance, other authors argue that 
institutional factors such as corruption levels only influence happiness levels in rich 
countries (Frey and Stutzer 2008; Bjørnskov et al. 2010). Their measures of 
governance strongly dominate per capita incomes as determinants of well-being. What 
is more, they investigate the relationship between a) governance quality delivery 
mechanisms and b) general trust and suicide rates. Their findings reveal a negative 
and significant relationship, for both regressors. It is important to note that for all 
robustness tests, aggregate governance and trust remain positive and statistically 
significant correlates of life satisfaction. The main interpretation behind this results 
could be that good governance, reflected by low levels of corruption, reduces law 
                                                   
7 Aggregate governance quality is the unweighted average of the six component indexes of 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 
1996-2004”: voice, political stability (democratic dimensions), governmental effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (delivery dimensions). 
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enforcement costs, market transactions are facilitated and transparency makes it 
easier for citizens to control politicians. In this sense, good governance or the quality of 
institutions might increase well-being and lower suicide rates. This finding is in line 
with the results of Tavits (2008) who, using data for 68 countries and survey data from 
16 European democracies, concludes that average happiness is lower under corrupt as 
opposed to clean regimes.  
Life satisfaction levels can also be affected through both quality and the level of 
employment (Kurer 1993). In a perfectly transparent environment, employment 
matches happen when a position is filled with the most qualified candidate who is 
willing to provide his services for certain compensation. However, when distortions are 
present, i.e. corruption, this procedure often leads to misallocation of talent and other 
resources. In countries where corruption is common and the public sector is sizeable, 
such a misallocation of talent due to personal relationships, bribes, favors, etc. 
(Glaeser and Saks 2006) can lead several highly qualified candidates into 
unemployment or low paid jobs and low skilled individuals into highly paid jobs. Such 
distortions often create unfair distribution of income and other resources directly 
impeding quality of life and life satisfaction measures. 
Corruption is argued to impede public provision of social services. According to this 
theory public officials exercise monopoly power and receive bribes in order to decide 
the quantity and quality of public services delivered. Gupta et al. (2000) show that less 
corruption and higher predictability of corruption are associated with higher quality of 
health and public services. Corruption hinders the provision of services in two ways: 
first, it increases the price paid, thus reducing the quantity demanded by the public, 
resulting in lower social welfare. Second, in the cases of “corruption with theft”, 
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officials withhold the charges received for a service or an output, lowering government 
revenues. Both cases result in distorting social welfare. In the first case, higher prices 
and lower consumption imply reduced consumer surplus. In the second case, reduced 
government revenues, imply lower future public services and government 
expenditures. Both outcomes have critical implications for quality of life, direct and 
indirect, and as a consequence for happiness and life satisfaction.  
In addition to quality and quantity distortions originating from corrupt practices, 
predatory behavior by corrupt politicians distorts the composition of government 
expenditure. Consequently, corruption reduces government spending on health and 
education (Mauro 1996; Delavallade 2006). Expenditure for both physical and mental 
health has substantial implications for curing health conditions. Gupta et al. (2000) 
find a positive relationship between corruption and i) infant and ii) child mortality 
rates. Moreover, expenditure on mental health care can prevent depression and hence 
suicide rates. In this direction, Minoiu and Andrés (2008) provide evidence that the 
share of public health and welfare expenditure at the state level reduces suicide rates. 
For example, welfare expenditures can be used as an indicator of social fairness that a 
given state intends to attain and therefore would influence satisfaction levels. Thus, 
corruption can affect suicidal events through reduction of public spending on health.  
The discussion as above leads us to propose the following testable hypothesis: 
  Hypothesis: Public sector corruption increases suicide rates. 
 
Data and empirical model.  
We use panel data for 24 OECD countries for the period 1995-2004.  As shown in the Appendix, 
Table A1, 24 OECD countries were included. The data comes  from several sources. Annual 
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suicide deaths are extracted from the WHO Mortality Database (past update Dec 2009)
8
 which 
contains information on country of origin, age group, gender, number and cause of deaths occurred.  
We use the corruption index compiled by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), where 
higher scores indicate less better governance quality or lower rates of  corruption
9
. Some authors 
argue that indices based on perceptions reflect the quality of a country’s institutions (Andvig 2005). 
Among the set of explanatory variables included are: per capita income, economic inequality, 
unemployment rates, divorce rates, total alcohol consumption, fertility rates, and total population. 
As a measure of income, we use the per capita real gross domestic product (INCOM) measured in 
2000  international dollars taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT v 6.3)
10
. Economic inequality 
(GINI) was proxied by the Gini coefficient which comes from the Standardized Income 
Distribution Database (SIDD) created by Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007)
11
. The SIDD 
adjusts the raw World Income Inequality Database (WIID) for differences in scope of coverage, 
income definition, and reference unit to a nationally representative, gross income, household per 
capita standard. Harmonized unemployment rates (UNEMP) were taken from the OECD database 
to allow for comparisons across countries. We also employ crude divorce rates (per 1,000 people) 
(DIV) taken from the United Nations Common Database, Demographic Yearbook
12
. Total recorded 
per capita alcohol consumption (ALCO) is obtained from the Global Information System on 
Alcohol and Health (GISAH) of the World Health Organization (WHO)
13
. Total fertility rates 
(FERTIL) are taken from the World Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2006). Lastly, 
                                                   
8 Available at http://www.who.int/whosis/mort/download/en/index.html (accessed May 10, 
2010). 
9 An important issue is how to define corruption. There are many definitions. Most share a 
common denominator which can be expressed as the abuse of public authority or position 
for private gains. 
10 The data are available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php (accessed 
January 15, 2010). 
11 The data are available at http://salvatorebabones.com/data-downloads (accessed March 
1, 2011). 
12 Available at http://data.un.org/Default.aspx (Accessed May 10, 2010). 
13 Available at http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/default.asp (Accessed May 10, 2010). 
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mid-year total population (POP) is taken from the WHO Mortality Database. 
The empirical model to explain suicide rates and analyze the impact of corruption on suicide 
takes the following form:  
 
SUICI(MSUICI, FSUICI) it =α1 CORRUPT it  +α2 ln(POP)it + α3 INCOMit  + α4 FERTIL it   
+α5GINI it + α6 UNEMP it +α7 DIVit +α8 ALCOit +mt+ ki +εit,  (1) 
where dependent variables in country i and year t are total suicide rates as SUICIit (male and female 
suicide rates). mt represents unobservable year specific effects such as macro-level shock in  year t. 
ki and εit represent individual effects of country i (a fixed effect country vector) and the error term 
of country i and year t, respectively.  mt is controlled by incorporating year dummies. ki holds the 
time invariant feature. So we can use the fixed effects model to capture ki (Baltagi 2005). The fixed 
effects allow to control for differences in national characteristics such as culture, religious concepts 
about death or life across nations, climate and traditional values, and periodical characteristics such 
as changes in social acceptance of suicide. The regression parameters to be estimated are captured 
by the vector α; and εit represents the classical error term.  
CORRUPT is measured on a scale from 0 to 6, with higher values denoting lower levels of 
corruption. If people are less likely to commit suicide in less corrupt societies, CORRUPT will take 
the negative sign. One of the reasons to employ a fixed effects model is that is a closed sample 
(homogenous) and we do not extrapolate these results to another set of countries. We also expect 
some correlation between the individual effects and some of the explanatory variables.  
Following the suicide literature, we include in the regressors several socioeconomic variables(e.g. 
Brainerd 2001, Kunce and Anderson 2002, Andrés 2005, Chuang and Huang 2007, Chen et al., 2009; 
Noh 2009, Yamamura 2010, Andrés et al. 2011). To begin, economic factors were captured by per 
capita income (INCOM), unemployment rate (UNEMP), and Gini index (GINI). If the improvement 
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of economic conditions reduces suicides by raising the expected utility (Hamermesh and Soss 1974), 
then the sign of the first coefficient is expected to be negative. Some panel data studies have found a 
significant negative relationship between per capita income and national suicide rates (Lin 2006; 
Brainerd 2001). Hamermesh and Soss (1974) examine the effect of unemployment on suicide and find 
that higher unemployment rates lead to higher suicide rates. Andrés (2005) concludes that 
unemployment leads to both higher male and female suicide rates. Higher income equality may give 
people a sense of social fairness, positively enhancing their level of satisfaction. It is also argued that 
income inequality may simply undermine social cohesion and hinder the formation of social capital, 
which may in turn influence health through the pathways of crime, public assistance, individual 
behavioral risks and socio-economic factors (Mellor and Milyo 2001; Kawachi and Kennedy 1997). 
Inequality is also viewed to reduce social integration and increase psychosocial stress (Wilkinson 
1996; Kawachi and Kennedy 1997). Therefore, from this perspective, suicide is expected to be 
positively related to economic inequality. The empirical evidence is mixed. Some studies find a 
significant psotively relationship between inequality and sucidie (Daly and Wilson 2006; Miniou and 
Andrés 2008) while others fail to find a statistically significant relationship (Andrés 2005). 
With regards to social factors, it is also widely accepted that fertility rates (FERTIL) have a 
negative effect on suicide. The presence of children might increase parents’ feelings of self-worth, 
possibly based on the perception of being needed. Recent studies have reported a large and negative 
association between aggregate fertility rate and suicide rates for males and females (Andrés 2005; 
Neumayer 2003b; Koo and Cox 2008). Alcohol consumption (ALCO) suggests a lack of social 
integration and is expected to be positively associated with suicide rates, a fact documented in 
Neumayer (2003a), Andrés (2005), and Chen et al. (2009) for males and Brainerd (2001) for 
females.  Divorce rates (DIV) reduces social integration and family ties. Divorce can cause 
depression, stress, mental health pain, and financial problems, which might result in risky behavior 
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like suicide. Therefore, divorce rates are indeed  positively correlated with suicides (Brainerd 
2001; Chuang and Huang 2007; Daly and Wilson 2009; Minoiu and Andrés 2008; Helliwell 2007; 
Yamamura 2010). We also control for the corresponding total populations to account for country 
size
14
. Table 1 provides definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables.  
It seems reasonable to assume that social position and role differ between males 
and females. For example, females aremore likely to spend a time on  housework than 
males. On the other hand, males most commonly spend considerably more time in the 
workplace than females. Therefore, labor market conditions are different between 
genders. Corruption in the public sector seems to have a critical influence on  labor 
market conditions. Hence, gender attitudes towards corruption event are expected to 
differ. In order to compare the effects of corruption on suicide between genders, we 
estimate separate models for males and females.  
 
Estimation results   
Results for total suicide rate under  the fixed effects models are given in Table 2. Results for 
male and female suicide rates are presented in Tables 3 and 4. We begin by looking at Table 2. In all 
estimations, CORRUPT yields the predicted negative sign, while being statistically significant. 
This result remains robust across specifications. The estimation result strongly supports the 
hypothesis proposed earlier. Further, absolute values of the coefficient on CORRUPT range from 
0.80 to 1.07. Thus, a one unit improvement in corruption index is associated with less instances of 
suicides of between 0.80 to 1.07 percentage points. This implies that one point increase of 
CORRUPT reduces suicide rate by 0.80 -1.07. With respect to other control variables, the 
significant negative sign of INCOM is observed in all columns, suggesting that increase of income 
                                                   
14 Using adjusted suicide rates to control for differences in the structure of population is 
equivalent to regress the crude rate and control for age structure of population. 
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reduces the suicide rate. The direction of the effect is consistent with the existing literature 
(Brainerd 2001; Neumayer 2003a, 2003b; Chuang and Huang 1997, 2007) as well as Hamermesh 
and Soss’ theory of suicide. Inequality (GINI), unemployment and fertility all have a negative but 
non statistically significant coefficient. The negative sign on FERTIL is in line with previous 
studies (e.g. Andrés 2005, Andrés et al. 2011). Regarding the effect of inequality, it could be the 
case that for OECD countries inequalities are not of great magnitude towards the bottom of the 
society and thus are not a significant determinant of suicides. DIV produces the positive sign and is 
statistically significant in columns (1) and (2), which suggests that divorce leads people to commit 
suicide. The positive sign of ALCO is in line with previous works (Andrés 2005; Yamamura 2010). 
ALCO is, however, not statistically significant. 
Now we turn to Table 3 and 4 to compare results between males and females. In all columns 
of Table 3, the coefficient on corruption is negative and statistically significant, a result which is 
robust across all specifications.  Further, the absolute values of CORRUPT range from 1.23 to 
1.70, implying that one point increase of CORRUPT leads to decrease of suicide rate by 1.23-1.70 
percentage points. The same result as above holds for the coefficient on corruption under all 
specifications presented in Table 4.  Absolute values of coefficient of CORRUPT  suggestthat an 
one point increase of CORRUPT leads to decrease of suicide rate by 0.38-0.56. These results imply  
that the impact of CORRUPT  on male suicide rate is approximately three times larger than that 
the one for females. In our interpretation, corruption has a negative influence on labor market and 
in turn has a larger and more direct impact on male than female. 
As for control variables, it is interesting to observe that INCOM yields the negative sign in 
all columns of Table 3 and is not statistically significant in columns (3)-(5) while INCOM produces 
the significant negative signs in all columns of Table 4. This suggests that income level is more 
closely associated with female suicide rate than male suicide rate. Table 3 exhibits that signs of 
 13 
 
FERTIL are positive in column (1) and negative in columns (2)-(4) whereas Table 4 presents that 
signs of FERTIL are negative in all columns and statistically significant in columns (1), (2) and (4). 
That is, fertility rates are only statistically significant in the female suicide equation.. Following 
Durkheimian arguments of social integration, fertility rates increase family integration and promote 
social ties and are thus expected to lower societal suicide rates. This result is consistent with panel 
data studies at regional and cross-country levels (Rodríguez 2006). The coefficient on divorce 
rates has a positive sign under all specifications presented in Tables 3 and 4. However, divorce 
appears to be  statistically significant only in the male regressions (Table 3) but not in Table 4. 
This is consistent with the finding of Yamamura (2010). Combined results of control variables 
reveal that relevant factors have different effect on suicide behavior between males and females, 
which appears to reflect the different socio-economic position between genders. 
 
Conclusion  
Although suicide research is a multidisciplinary subject, socioeconomic factors are well 
documented risk factors for suicide. Past research has neglected the role of governance quality 
indicators. In particular, this study explored how corruption influences suicide rate using a panel 
dataset for 24 OECD countries. Empirical results from the fixed effects estimation revealed that 
suicide rates are lower in countries with lower levels of corruption even after various 
socio-economic factors are controlled for. This result remains robust across specifications. 
Furthermore,  the coefficient on corruption is larger  for males  than for females From this, we 
derive the argument that reduction of government expenditure for mental and psychological health 
care caused by corruption has a greater influence on  social well-being for males rather than 
females.   
We find the different effect of corruption on suicide rate between genders. We, however, do 
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not explore the reason why the effect of corruption differs between males and females. For such 
purpose, individual rather than aggregate data should be used. This issue remains to be addressed in 
future work. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions, means, and standard deviations (N = 102). 
Variables Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
SUICI Suicide rate (per 100,000) 14.5 6.4 
MSUICI Male suicide rate (per 100,000) 21.4 9.4 
FSUIC Female suicide rate (per 100,000) 7.8 4.1 
CORRUPT Degree of corruption 4.6 1.0 
ALCO Recorded adult per capita alcohol consumption (in 
liters) 
10.7  3.0 
GINI Gini coefficient 0.42 0.11 
INCOM Per capita income ($1000 US) 23.2 7.0 
UNEMP Unemployment rate (%) 7.4 3.6 
DIV Crude divorce rate (per 1,000; %) 2.0 0.9 
FERTIL Fertility rate, total (births per woman)     1.6      0.2 
POP Mid-year population (millions)    37.2     58.9 
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Table 2 
Determinants of total suicide rate: Panel data regression models. Fixed effects models (1995-2004).  
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) 
 
CORRUPT -0.83** 
(-2.38) 
-0.80** 
(-2.27) 
-1.07** 
(-2.77) 
-0.97** 
(-2.37) 
-1.05** 
(-2.50) 
-1.06** 
(-2.27) 
-1.06** 
(-2.29) 
Ln(POP) 
 
25.7** 
(2.31) 
23.1* 
(1.86) 
22.6 
(1.50) 
21.3 
(1.51) 
18.2 
(1.50) 
1.48 
(0.12) 
 
INCOM -0.32* 
       (-1.98) 
-0.27** 
       (-2.12) 
-0.28* 
       (-1.89) 
-0.25* 
       (-1.75) 
-0.27* 
       (-1.86) 
  
FERTIL -1.19 
(-0.44) 
-1.86 
(-0.65) 
-2.55 
(-0.75) 
-1.59 
(-0.48) 
   
GINI -0.27 
 (-0.10) 
-0.76 
 (-0.26) 
3.76 
(0.58) 
    
UNEMP  0.06 
(0.49) 
 0.05 
(0.38) 
     
DIV 2.46** 
(2.11) 
2.26** 
(2.11) 
     
ALCO 0.34 
(0.83) 
      
R-squared (Within) 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.13 
No. of observations 184 184 199 208 234 234 234 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by calculated by using robust standard errors adjusted for within-nation clustering. * and **indicate 
significance at 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively. Country and year dummies are included in all estimations, but to save space are not reported. In each 
column, the sample size may vary across different specifications due to data availability. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of male suicide rate: Panel data regression models. Fixed effects models (1995-2004).  
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) 
 
CORRUPT -1.29** 
(-2.47) 
-1.23** 
(-2.34) 
-1.70** 
(-2.78) 
-1.52** 
(-2.35) 
-1.58** 
(-2.49) 
-1.60** 
(-2.26) 
-1.59** 
(-2.29) 
Ln(POP) 
 
33.1 
(1.55) 
28.6 
(1.24) 
26.9 
(1.01) 
22.6 
(0.91) 
17.9 
(0.86) 
-7.71 
(-0.36) 
 
INCOM -0.49* 
       (-1.70) 
-0.41* 
       (-1.79) 
-0.44 
       (-1.59) 
-0.39 
       (-1.45) 
-0.41 
       (-1.55) 
  
FERTIL 0.07 
(0.02) 
-1.06 
(-0.22) 
-2.76 
(-0.46) 
-0.32 
(-0.05) 
   
GINI 0.18 
 (0.03) 
-0.63 
 (-0.11) 
4.44 
(0.48) 
    
UNEMP  0.20 
(0.84) 
 0.17 
(0.74) 
     
DIV 4.57** 
(2.48) 
4.23** 
(2.54) 
     
ALCO 0.58 
(0.87) 
      
R-squared (Within) 0.38 0.37 0.30 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.12 
No. of observations 184 184 199 208 234 234 234 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by calculated by using robust standard errors adjusted for within-nation clustering.. * and ** 
indicate significance at 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively. Country and year dummies are included in all estimations, but to save space are not reported. 
In each column, the sample size may vary across different specifications due to data availability. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of female suicide rate: Panel data regression models. Fixed effects models (1995-2004).  
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) 
 
CORRUPT -0.40* 
(-1.95) 
-0.38* 
(-1.89) 
-0.47** 
(-2.46) 
-0.45** 
(-2.24) 
-0.54** 
(-2.35) 
-0.55** 
(-2.16) 
-0.56** 
(-2.15) 
Ln(POP) 
 
19.1*** 
(4.91) 
18.3*** 
(4.04) 
18.7*** 
(3.06) 
20.4*** 
(3.44) 
18.9*** 
(3.25) 
10.3* 
(1.70) 
 
INCOM -0.16*** 
       (-3.15) 
-0.14*** 
       (-3.12) 
-0.13*** 
       (-2.92) 
-0.13** 
       (-2.70) 
-0.13** 
       (-2.78) 
  
FERTIL -2.47* 
(-1.74) 
-2.67* 
(-1.85) 
-2.39 
(-1.67) 
-2.93** 
(-2.17) 
   
GINI -0.69 
 (-0.49) 
-0.84 
 (-0.61) 
3.04 
(0.77) 
    
UNEMP  -0.06 
(-0.94) 
 -0.06 
(-1.05) 
     
DIV 0.45 
(0.81) 
0.39 
(0.72) 
     
ALCO 0.10 
(0.57) 
      
R-squared (Within) 0.21 0.25 0.31 0.28 0.15 0.12 0.10 
No. of observations 184 184 199 208 234 234 234 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by calculated by using robust standard errors adjusted for within-nation clustering. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Country and year dummies are included in all estimations, but to save space are not reported. 
In each column, the sample size may vary across different specifications due to data availability. 
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APPENDIX.  
Table A1. OECD countries in the regression analysis   
 
 
Australia Japan 
Austria Luxembourg 
Belgium Netherlands 
Canada New Zealand 
Denmark Norway 
Finland Portugal 
France South Korea 
Germany Spain 
Greece Sweden 
Iceland Switzerland 
Ireland United Kingdom 
Italy United States 
